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In its consideration of alternative sites for new nuclear power plants, the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) uses a standard that the applicant’s proposed site will not be 
rejected in favor of an alternative site unless the NRC staff determines that the alternative site is 
“obviously superior” to the proposed site1.  In this paper I will summarize the historical 
development of this standard and how this standard has fared in the courts.  I will then examine 
the extent to which this standard complies with the requirements of National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended2 and the associated regulations published by the 
Council on Environmental Quality3.  I will also examine how the standard compares to the 
approaches used by other agencies, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (which uses a 
standard of the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative).  In conclusion, I will 
discuss whether the NRC should consider modifying the standard either because of challenges to 
its past implementation, or foreseeable changes in future implementation. 
 
What is the “obviously superior” criterion and how is it used? 
 
The obviously superior criterion is used by the NRC during its evaluation of sites for new 
nuclear power plants under NEPA.  The use of the criterion is described in the NRC staff’s 
guidance for the evaluation of the power plat applicant’s site selection process in the 
Environmental Standard Review Plan (ESRP), Section 9.34.  The ESRP directs the staff to 
determine whether any of the alternative sites is obviously superior to the applicant’s proposed 
site. 
 
In order to determine whether an alternative site is obviously superior, the staff must first 
determine whether it is environmentally preferable.  The basis for this part of the evaluation is 
that the staff won’t consider whether an alternative site is obviously superior unless it offers 
environmental advantages over the proposed site.  If the staff concludes that an alternative site is 
environmentally preferable to the proposed site, then it must determine whether the alternative 
site is obviously superior to the proposed site.  In this stage of the evaluation the staff will 
consider non-environmental factors such as the cost of building and operating the plant at each 
site, and institutional factors5. 
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The obviously superior criterion was developed specifically for use in the site selection process.  
However, by logical extension the NRC staff guidance includes similar considerations in the 
evaluation of alternative energy sources (ESRP Section 9.2.3)6.  In this case, if the staff 
determines that an energy alternative is environmentally preferable to the proposed nuclear 
plant(s), then the staff would consider the cost of the alternative versus the proposed action to 
determine whether the alternative is obviously superior. 
 
If the staff identifies an obviously superior alternative (either a site or an energy alternative), the 
guidance indicates that the staff should recommend to the Commission that the proposed action 
not be approved.  The staff cannot recommend the adoption of the obviously superior alternative 
because the NRC does not have the authority to do so – it can only approve or disapprove the 
proposed action.  The Commission is not required to follow the staff’s recommendation.  NEPA 
does not mandate a specific outcome – it requires the consideration of environmental values in 
the decision-making process. 
 
What are the origins of the “obviously superior” criterion? 
 
Based on a search of historical records, the earliest record in which the term “obviously superior” 
was used in a licensing decision was during the licensing of the Seabrook Station.  In the 
December 1974 final environmental statement for a construction permit for Seabrook7, the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission staff summarized its review of the proposed and alternative sites on 
page 9-10 and concluded by stating: 
 
“Of the 19 potential sites that were evaluated, the staff concludes that none of the other 
sites offer any obvious superiority to the Seabrook location.” 
 
Interveners challenged the Seabrook application, in part because they believed the NRC staff had 
failed to properly consider alternative sites and had failed to recognize advantages at some of 
those sites.  The Commission reviewed the staff’s evaluation, and the associated Licensing Board 
Panel decision8.  The Commission stated its standard for the review of alternative sites in its 
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March 31, 1977, decision, CLI-77-89.  In its decision, on pages 522 and 526, the Commission 
wrote: 
 
“What has proved less clear, however, is the basis on which this comparison [of sites] is 
to occur – whether we may approve a proposed reactor only if the proposed site proves 
the most advantageous among those considered, i.e., the optimal site, or whether some 
less rigorous standard is appropriate.   
… 
In this context, we conclude that our staff has correctly stated the test to be employed in 
assessing whether a proposed site is to be rejected in favor of any of the alternative sites 
considered, namely, whether an alternate site is obviously superior to the site which the 
applicant had proposed.”  [Citation omitted] 
 
The Commission went on to point out the nature of the consideration of alternatives under NEPA 
– specifically that NEPA does not require the selection of the best alternative from an 
environmental perspective.  Rather, it requires the consideration of environmental values in 
making a decision.  The Commission explained the basis for its reasoning regarding the 
obviously superior criterion in more detail on pages 528 to 530 of the decision: 
 
“Two significant realities of the NEPA process support the use of the standard of obvious 
superiority–the inherent imprecision of cost/benefit analysis and the probability that more 
adverse information has been developed regarding the closely examined proposed site 
than any alternates.  The imprecision springs from the nature of the cost/benefit analysis 
the Commission must perform: in the nuclear licensing context the factors to be 
compared range from broad concerns of system planning, safety, engineering, economic 
and institutional factors to environmental concerns, including ecological, biological, 
aesthetic, sociological, recreational, and so forth.  Much of the underlying cost-benefit 
data is difficult of articulation, much less quantification.  Given these difficulties, any 
evaluation of a particular site must inevitably have a wide margin of uncertainty.  …  But 
where the data to be compared necessarily present a wide margin of uncertainty, one site 
must appear to be substantially “better.”  To reject an application – the only means 
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available for indicating the preferability of an alternate site – at this late stage in the 
licensing process requires substantial confidence that one’s judgment is correct – a 
confidence that can only arise where an alternate site is obviously superior.  [Footnote 
omitted.] 
… 
This conclusion appears the stronger when one considers that the applicant’s proposed 
site comes before the Board after having been intensively studied by the applicant, staff, 
and intervenors for a period of years. …  The alternate sites to which the proposed site is 
compared have undergone no comparable study.  Common sense teaches that the more 
closely a site is analyzed, the more adverse environmental impacts are likely to be 
discovered.  It would, therefore, be mistaken to conclude that an alternate site which 
appeared marginally superior to the proposed site, would remain superior upon further 
investigation, considering all of the possible but unknown disadvantages of the alternate 
site.  [Footnote omitted.] 
… 
Our acceptance of the “obviously superior” standard for site selection derives, as well, 
from the reality of our situation in passing on license applications.  The licensing process 
is structured for rejection or acceptance of the proposed site rather than choice of sites.  
…  In sum, we think it appropriate that a licensing board refuse to take the proposed 
“major Federal action,” i.e., deny the requested license, not when some alternative site 
appears marginally “better” but when the alternative site is obviously superior.” 
 
This Commission decision publicly documented the approach that the NRC staff was to use in its 
consideration of alternative sites and explained the legal basis for that approach.   
 
Interveners challenged the Commission’s March 1977 decision regarding Seabrook in court.  
Included in this challenge was the use of the obviously superior criterion.  On August 22, 1978, 
The U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, decided in favor of the Commission regarding this 
criterion in New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC10.  In explaining the basis for its 
decision the Court stated in paragraph 30: 
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“The obvious superiority standard, as it is explained in the Commission's opinion, says 
nothing about whether or how the required studies [i.e., the “hard look” at alternatives 
required by NEPA] will be performed. Rather it goes to what the Commission will do 
with findings that the studies will generate. The standard is designed to guarantee that a 
proposed site will not be rejected in favor of a substitute unless, on the basis of 
appropriate study, the Commission can be confident that such action is called for. Given 
the necessary imprecision of the cost-benefit analyses involved and the fact that the 
proposed site will inevitably have been subjected to far closer scrutiny than any alternate 
site, we cannot say that it is unreasonable to insist on a high degree of assurance that the 
extreme action of denying an application is appropriate. This is especially so since NEPA 
does not require that a plant be built on the single best site for environmental purposes. 
All that NEPA requires is that alternative sites be considered and that the effects on the 
environment of building the plant at the alternative sites be carefully studied and factored 
into the ultimate decision.” 
 
Thus, the Court concluded that the approach that was being employed by the NRC – the use of 
the obviously superior criterion – was appropriate and legally sound. 
 
In the meantime, in the wake of the Commission’s decision on Seabrook, the NRC staff was 
working to address concerns related to the process of siting nuclear power plants.  On August 16, 
1977, the staff submitted to the Commission SECY-77-433, Policy Statement on Alternative Site 
Evaluations under NEPA for Nuclear Generating Stations11.  This paper was focused on a 
discussion of the appropriate decision standard that the NRC staff should use when comparing 
the proposed and alternative sites.  The staff considered various options in the paper, and on 
pages 8-9 of the SECY recommended to the Commission the use of: 
 
“A multi-part decision standard which reflects the three stages in the evaluation of 
alternative sites.  For the identification of candidate sites a decision standard of among 
the best that could reasonably be found should be employed.  For the selection of a 
preferred site from a set of candidate sites, a decision standard of no obviously superior 
alternative should be employed.  To determine whether to reject the preferred site 
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because of contentions about its relative merit that arise during the CP [construction 
permit] review of its environmental suitability a decision standard which requires 
demonstration of an obviously superior alternative and consideration of the costs of 
completion should be employed.” 
 
The first part of the decision standard, which is still used today, is that the NRC staff must 
conclude that the candidate sites identified by the applicant are among the best that could be 
identified.  Implicit in this part of the standard is the recognition that the NRC staff is not 
required to determine that the candidate sites are the best sites.  These sites are then considered in 
the next part of the process, in which the staff must determine whether any of the alternative sites 
is obviously superior to the proposed site.  The final part of the standard recommended in this 
paper addresses a case in which site selection is challenged after construction at the site has 
commenced.  In those cases, the NRC staff concluded that the sunk costs at the proposed site 
could be considered in weighing the advantages of the alternative sites because the applicant had 
spent those funds based on the NRC staff’s approval of a construction permit, i.e., the applicant 
had acted in good faith.  Although the policy statement that was recommended in SECY-77-433 
was never published, the explanation of the decision standard aligns with the practice employed 
by the NRC staff then, and today. 
 
The obviously superior criterion was also prominent in an early site review performed by the 
NRC staff regarding the proposed Perryman site.  In response to a request from Baltimore Gas & 
Electric (BG&E)12, the staff prepared a report dated November 1977, Evaluation of Alternative 
Sites – Perryman Early Site Review13.  In its review, the NRC staff was most concerned with the 
population around the site, although it also expressed concerns related to nearby industrial and 
military activities – the site was adjacent to the U.S. Army’s Aberdeen Proving Grounds.  On 
page 3 of the Summary and Conclusions, the NRC staff stated: 
 
“In summary, the preliminary balancing by the staff of significant environmental, 
economic, and safety related aspects of the alternative sites has led us to the conclusion 
that there is at least one alternative site available to BG&E which is obviously superior to 
the Perryman site.” 
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The staff considered the population issue and associated risks from accidents to be a factor that 
would be considered a part of the review performed under NEPA.  See Section 9.2 of the 
February 1979 ESRP, Appendix C, Criteria for Identifying Obviously Superior Sites14.  
 
Interveners also challenged the NRC staff’s handling of the alternative sites issue for the Sterling 
site, which Rochester Gas and Electric had proposed for use for a new nuclear station.  The 
interveners contended that the Ginna site, which already hosted a nuclear power plant, was a 
better choice.  The issue was reviewed by the Atomic Licensing Appeal Board (ALAB) and in its 
October 19, 1978, decision, ALAB-50215, the Board stated: 
 
“Application of this [obviously superior] standard mandates rejection of Ecology 
Action’s assertion that the Licensing Board was required to disapprove use of the Sterling 
site given its findings that the Ginna site is marginally preferable. 
 …  
Indeed, were we called upon to determine on the record brought to us which site was on 
balance the best choice from an environmental standpoint, our task would be a most 
difficult one.  Fortunately, however, we need not make that determination.  All that we 
must decide is whether Ginna is “obviously” – in other words, clearly and substantially – 
superior to Sterling.” 
 
Summarizing this history, the obviously superior criterion was developed by the NRC staff in the 
mid-1970s as part of the process used to evaluate alternative sites.  It has been supported by 
licensing boards, the Commission, and the Courts.  The criterion is intended to ensure that the 
NRC will not reject a proposed site in favor of an alternative unless such an action is clearly 
justified. 
 
Is the obviously superior criterion consistent with Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
guidance? 
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Guidance related to the consideration of alternatives is provided by CEQ in its “Forty Most 
Asked Questions about NEPA.”16  In the response to Question 6a, CEQ states: 
 
“The environmentally preferable alternative is the alternative that will promote the 
national environmental policy as expressed in NEPA's Section 101. Ordinarily, this 
means the alternative that causes the least damage to the biological and physical 
environment; it also means the alternative which best protects, preserves, and enhances 
historic, cultural, and natural resources.” 
 
The response goes on to discuss a key challenge agencies face in the process of identifying an 
environmentally preferable alternative: 
 
“The Council recognizes that the identification of the environmentally preferable 
alternative may involve difficult judgments, particularly when one environmental value 
must be balanced against another. The public and other agencies reviewing a Draft EIS 
can assist the lead agency to develop and determine environmentally preferable 
alternatives by providing their views in comments on the Draft EIS. Through the 
identification of the environmentally preferable alternative, the decisionmaker is clearly 
faced with a choice between that alternative and others, and must consider whether the 
decision accords with the Congressionally declared policies of the Act.” 
 
The final sentence of the response references a key aspect of NEPA – that the decision maker is 
not required by NEPA to choose the alternative that causes the least environmental damage.  
Rather, the decision maker must consider environmental values in reaching a decision.  But other 
non-environmental factors may lead to a decision to choose other than the environmentally 
preferable alternative. 
 
This issue is further amplified in CEQ’s response to Question 4a, in which it states: 
 
“The "agency's preferred alternative" is the alternative which the agency believes would 
fulfill its statutory mission and responsibilities, giving consideration to economic, 
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environmental, technical and other factors. The concept of the "agency's preferred 
alternative" is different from the "environmentally preferable alternative," although in 
some cases one alternative may be both.” 
 
In other words, NEPA does not require the decision maker to consider only environmental 
factors, to the exclusion of all other considerations, when choosing among alternatives. 
 
The obviously superior criterion, as used by the NRC staff, is consistent with this guidance.  
First, the NRC staff determines whether any of the alternative sites is environmentally preferable 
to the proposed site.  In other words, the staff first determines whether, based purely on 
environmental factors, any alternative appears to be measurably better than the proposed site.  If 
the answer to this question is “no”, then the proposed site prevails.  This is appropriate because if 
no alternative site offers measurable advantages over the proposed site, then there is no reason 
under NEPA to reject the proposed site. 
 
If the NRC staff determines that there is an environmentally preferable alternative site, then the 
staff must determine whether that alternative site is obviously superior to the proposed site, 
considering the cost of building and operating the plant at each site, and institutional factors.  
The term “institutional factors” is not currently defined in ESRP 9.3.  However, information on 
this subject has been included in Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)-02617, Attachment 6, page 6 
where it states:   
 
Institutional constraints could include items such as (1) known objections of regulatory 
agencies, (2) grid stability issues at the alternative site, (3) lack of franchise privileges 
and eminent domain powers, (4) the need to restructure existing financial and business 
arrangements, and (5) the feasibility of obtaining the alternative site. 
 
The staff’s approach is consistent with the CEQ guidance, under which economic, technical and 
other factors may be considered in choosing an agency preferred alternative that is not the 
environmentally preferable alternative. 
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Part of the underlying basis for the obviously superior criterion is that the proposed site has been 
studied in greater depth than the alternative sites.  Because of this fact, the Commission and the 
Courts have recognized that it is likely that further study of the alternative sites would reveal 
additional problems at those sites.  But is it acceptable to make a decision without having studied 
the alternative sites to the same depth as the proposed site?  In the response to Question 5b, CEQ 
states: 
 
“The degree of analysis devoted to each alternative in the EIS is to be substantially 
similar to that devoted to the "proposed action." Section 1502.14 is titled "Alternatives 
including the proposed action" to reflect such comparable treatment. Section 1502.14(b) 
specifically requires "substantial treatment" in the EIS of each alternative including the 
proposed action. This regulation does not dictate an amount of information to be 
provided, but rather, prescribes a level of treatment, which may in turn require varying 
amounts of information, to enable a reviewer to evaluate and compare alternatives.” 
 
The approach used by the NRC staff comports with this portion of the CEQ guidance.  The 
consideration of the alternative sites is based on the collection of reconnaissance level 
information for those sites – see Regulatory Guide (RG) 4.7, General Site Suitability Criteria for 
Nuclear Power Stations18, page 4, and RG 4.2, Preparation of Environmental Reports for 
Nuclear Power Stations 19, Sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2.  Under this NRC staff guidance to 
applicants, the applicants are expected to obtain whatever information is available regarding the 
alternative sites.  However, the NRC staff expects the applicants to compare the sites in a fair 
and unbiased manner.  See the discussion under “Proposed and Alternative Sites” in Revision 1 
to ESRP 9.320, Site Selection Process.  Indeed, there have been cases in recent years in which the 
NRC staff has challenged a process used by an applicant because it did not treat all of the sites in 
the same way.  For example, the NRC staff raised a number of questions related to the process 
used by the applicant in its original site selection process for the South Texas Plant, Units 3 and 
4, combined license application, including questions related to the equitable treatment of 
sites21,22.  In response, the applicant performed a new siting evaluation, developed a revised set 
of alternative sites, and submitted an associated revision to its application23.   
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As discussed previously, in New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, the Court 
found the approach used by the NRC to be consistent with the intent of NEPA.  In its decision 
the Court recognized that “the proposed site will inevitably have been subjected to far closer 
scrutiny than any alternate site.”  In Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission v. 
United States Environmental Protection Agency24, a case involving similar issues before the U.S 
Court of Appeals, First Circuit, the Court stated in paragraph 21: 
 
“No purpose would be served by requiring EPA to study exhaustively all environmental 
impacts at each alternative site considered once it has reasonably concluded that none of 
the alternatives will be substantially preferable to the proposed site. Moreover, the 
guideline adopted by EPA to limit its study of alternatives appears, in this case, to be 
consistent with the "rule of reason" by which a court measures federal agency compliance 
with NEPA's procedural requirements.” 
 
Based on the CEQ guidance and the Court cases, it’s clear that the alternative sites need not be 
studied to the same depth as the proposed site.  Therefore, the use of reconnaissance-level 
information, as discussed in NRC staff guidance, is an appropriate approach for the consideration 
of alternatives.  But equally important is the need to compare the sites in a way that is balanced 
and unbiased in order to conclude whether there is an obviously superior alternative site. 
 
How does the obviously superior criterion compare to the approaches used by other agencies? 
 
While the Courts have upheld the approach used by the NRC, how does it compare with the 
methods used by other agencies with a regulatory role?  In considering this question, this paper 
compared the NRC approach with the approaches used by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), two other agencies with 
regulatory (as opposed to resource management) functions. 
 
The USACE evaluates alternatives using the Section 404(b)(1) guidelines under the Clean Water 
Act25.  Under the guidelines, the USACE must identify the least environmentally damaging 
practicable alternative (LEDPA).  In order to accomplish this, the USACE must consider both 
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the environmental impacts of an alternative (with specific emphasis on impacts to the aquatic 
ecosystem) and the practicability of the alternative.  The environmental component of the 
evaluation is similar to the NRC staff’s evaluation of alternatives to determine whether any are 
environmentally preferable.  However, for the USACE there will be special emphasis on impacts 
to the aquatic ecosystem (and in particular, to wetlands).  The practicability portion of the 
evaluation is similar to the evaluation that the NRC staff would perform to determine whether an 
environmentally preferable alternative site is obviously superior to the proposed site.  
Specifically, the Section 404(b)(1) guidelines direct the USACE to consider an alternative to be 
practicable “if it is available and capable of being done after taking into consideration cost, 
existing technology, and logistics in light of overall project purposes.”  This is very similar to the 
NRC staff’s consideration of the cost of building and operating the plant at each site, and 
institutional factors. 
 
The USACE also considers “public interest factors” in its consideration of alternatives.  As 
discussed in the introduction to Chapter 2 of the USACE draft EIS26 for the Moffat Collection 
System Project near Denver, page 2-1: 
 
“The alternatives must satisfy the Guidelines as well as the public interest review (33 
CFR 320.4[a]). Therefore, for Corps permit actions, the range of practicable alternatives 
is typically a subset of reasonable alternatives under NEPA. According to the Corps’ 
NEPA guidance, the alternatives analysis for actions subject to NEPA and the Guidelines 
can be integrated simultaneously to ensure alternatives carried forward for analysis are 
practicable and that the LEDPA has not been eliminated from further consideration. The 
comparison of alternatives should “allow a complete and objective evaluation of the 
public interest and a fully informed decision regarding the permit application” (33 CFR 
325 Appendix B 9 [b][5]).”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The NRC staff has direct experience in the relative similarities and differences between its 
evaluations of alternative sites as compared to the evaluations of the USACE because the 
USACE has been a cooperating agency on recent EISs for new reactors (e.g., Levy County27).  In 
general, the NRC and the USACE have reached the same conclusions regarding the alternative 
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sites, with one notable exception.  For the Levy County application, the NRC staff concluded 
that the Crystal River site (with its existing power plants) was a reasonable alternative for 
consideration under NEPA.  But the USACE, based on input from the applicant, accepted that 
the Crystal River site was not a practicable alternative28.  The applicant for Levy County stated 
that the site was impracticable because installing so much generating capacity (over 5000 MW) 
in one location on the Florida coast would present a significant risk to the grid because a single 
event (hurricane, tornado) could cause the loss of all of that generating capacity29.  As a result of 
these different conclusions, the Crystal River site was considered in the NEPA evaluation 
prepared jointly by the NRC and the USACE, but it was not considered by the USACE in a 
comparison of sites to determine the LEDPA site. 
 
Based on the regulatory requirements and on experience working with the USACE, the processes 
used by each agency to consider alternatives are similar. 
 
FERC uses a somewhat different approach, as discussed in its guidance document, Preparing 
Environmental Documents; Guidelines for Applicants, Contractors, and Staff30.  The method that 
FERC uses essentially looks at all of the factors (environmental, economic, technical) at once to 
determine the best overall alternative.  The guidance appears to be based on the assumption that 
it will be clear to the decision maker which alternative offers the best results overall, although 
the guidance also recognizes the difficulty in comparing disparate resources.  For example, on 
page 73 the guidance states:   
 
In evaluating alternatives, first we need to understand how the value of each competing 
resource varies for each option we are considering. This could be based on quantitative or 
qualitative information. This could involve a relatively straightforward relationship, such 
as the relationship between quantity of adult fish habitat (weighted usable area) and 
power benefits. Or it could be more involved. For example, how does raising the instream 
flow to improve fish habitat in the bypassed reach affect riparian vegetation, swimming 
and boating, and the project’s power value or how does releasing more water to improve 
downstream water quality affect reservoir boating and fish habitat and amount of 
generation? 
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Based on the way the guidance is written (see, for example, page 72), it’s clear that FERC has 
more authority to impose conditions than does the NRC.  Starting around the time of the Yellow 
Creek decision31 in 1978 the NRC staff began to move away from its then common practice of 
placing environmental conditions on its licenses for resources that were under the authority of 
other agencies.  Although the NRC’s regulations still allow the staff to impose environmental 
conditions for other than the aquatic environment (see 10 CFR 50.36b32), a recent rulemaking33 
has made clear that the NRC staff’s reach is very limited.  This difference in the authority 
between FERC and NRC may explain the difference in the approaches.  Because FERC is in a 
position to impose conditions over a wider range of resources, it can essentially modify projects 
to minimize environmental impacts, while considering costs and the project purpose and need.   
 
However, although the NRC is limited in its ability to impose conditions for issues not related to 
its mission of radiological protection, it does often rely in its EISs on conditions that other 
agencies plan to implement in other permits that an applicant must obtain to build and operate a 
nuclear plant.  So for example, the NRC will not set a limit on the discharge temperature from 
the plant.  But in evaluating the impacts to the receiving water body, the NRC staff will rely on 
the limit that the State has imposed (or will impose) in its National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit. 
 
In developing its conditions for a license, FERC does consider the cost-benefit balancing for 
each condition.  See Sections 4.3 and 5.2 of the FERC guidance.  So in the end, the action 
recommended by FERC would be the practicable alternative that best limits the environmental 
impacts.  While FERC has taken a rather different path based on its regulatory authority, it seems 
likely that the outcome would be similar to that which would be reached by either the NRC or 
the USACE.   
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
The NRC staff developed the obviously superior criterion during the 1970s, at the height of the 
boom in new reactor licensing that was occurring at that time.  The criterion was developed to 
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ensure that the NRC would not reject a site (through the associated reactor licensing application) 
unless it was clearly justified in doing so.  In addition, the criterion and it usage appear to be 
consistent with CEQ guidance and with the processes used by other regulatory agencies.  The 
essential reasons that led to the development of the criterion – the nature of the NRC licensing 
decision as either approval or rejection of the proposed site and the use of reconnaissance level 
information for the alternative sites – remain unchanged. 
 
The criterion has been challenged in front of licensing and appeal boards, the Commission, and 
the courts, and has consistently withstood those challenges.  During the more recent reactor 
licensing reviews, starting in 2003, there have been no challenges specifically aimed at the 
obviously superior criterion, although the criterion has been invoked in every associated 
environmental impact statement.   
 
Based on the preceding, there would appear to be no reason to consider changing the criterion.  
The process works as intended and provides the decision-maker with the information that is 
needed to make an informed decision under NEPA. 
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